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Abstract
We discuss the behaviour of variants of the standard negative translations – Kolmogorov, Gödel-
Gentzen, Kuroda and Glivenko – in propositional logics with a unary normal modality. More
specifically, we address the question whether negative translations as a rule embed faithfully a
classical modal logic into its intuitionistic counterpart. As it turns out, even the Kolmogorov
translation can go wrong with rather natural modal principles. Nevertheless, we isolate sufficient
syntactic criteria ensuring adequacy of well-behaved (or, in our terminology, regular) translations
for logics axiomatized with formulas satisfying these criteria, which we call enveloped implications.
Furthermore, a large class of computationally relevant modal logics – namely, logics of type
inhabitation for applicative functors (a.k.a. idioms) – turns out to validate the modal counterpart
of the Double Negation Shift, thus ensuring adequacy of even the Glivenko translation. All our
positive results are proved purely syntactically, using the minimal natural deduction system of
Bellin, de Paiva and Ritter extended with additional axioms/combinators and hence also allow
a direct formalization in a proof assistant (in our case Coq).
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1 Introduction
A normal modality  over the intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) can be seen as a
restricted universal quantifier, but also – given the interpretation of IPC in (bi)cartesian closed
categories – as the syntactic counterpart of an endofunctor (monoidal w.r.t. the cartesian
structure [6, 16]) or – from the Curry-Howard point of view – a type constructor distributing
over conjunctions/products (see [6, 44, 31, 16, 36] for an overview and more references). It
is, in short, the most natural way of extending IPC, which stops short of the full complexity
of proper quantifiers (dependent types), i.e., the intuitionistic predicate calculus (IQC). The
computational interpretation and importance of negative translations is well-known (cf., e.g.,
[27, 39, 1] and [48, Ch. 6]) and their behaviour is rather well-understood not only for IPC,
but also for IQC. Modal logic also has a very well-developed metatheory, not only over the
classical propositional calculus (CPC), but also over IPC. See, e.g., [26, 11, 49, 56, 57, 59].
It would seem then that the following problem should have been fully solved by now.
Consider the simplest possible modal extension L of the syntax of IPC. Take the standard
notion of a (normal) logic iZ in such a language (§ 2) and whichever variant t of the
standard negative translations the reader prefers (§ 3). Is such a translation t by default
adequate for every iZ – that is, given any φ ∈ L, is it the case that φ ∈ cZ = iZ + CPC
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iff φt ∈ iZ (§ 4)? If not, is it possible to find some general criteria on the axiomatization of
iZ which ensure adequacy – and show correctness of these criteria in a purely syntactic way
(§ 5)? Can it happen that for entire classes of logic with good computational, type-theoretic
and categorical motivation, the simplest possible translation (Glivenko) would be adequate
(§ 6)?
And yet, to the best of our knowledge, while the question of adequacy of negative
translations (we call this property ¬¬-completeness) has been addressed for the minimal
system iK [11, 28] (see also § 7 for a discussion of [7]), there has been no systematic study
for arbitrary axioms. Our paper aims to fill this gap.
Negative translations (mostly Glivenko) have been studied for other non-classical logics,
especially substructural ones [23, 43, 20]. The Gödel-Gentzen translation also plays an
important rôle in the recently developed theory of possibility semantics for modal logic
[53, 28]. Moreover, our lack of systematic knowledge regarding ¬¬-completeness contrasts
with the existence of exhaustive studies of Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski-type translations of
L-logics [11, 56, 57].
On the other hand, negative translations can quickly go very wrong with natural and
important extensions of intuitionistic logic. As we are going to discuss in § 4.1, a striking
example is provided by the logic of bunched implications BI. Thus, beginning the systematic
study of modal negative translations with a single normal  seems the right level of generality
at the moment.
A systematic investigation of ¬¬-completeness seems warranted by Simpson’s [46, Ch 3.2]
influential requirements that an intuitionistic modal logic is supposed to satisfy, in particular,
Requirement 3: The addition of α∨¬α to an intuitionistic modal logic should yield a standard
classical modal logic. This requirement turns out to be disputable from at least two points of
view. On the one hand, it is too restrictive: there are entire classes of important intuitionistic
modal logics which classically collapse to rather trivial systems. See the discussion of iR
and its extensions like PLL and SL in § 6, especially Remark 25 (ironically, even the Glivenko
translation is adequate for such logics); other “classically near-degenerate” examples can
be found in provability logics of extensions of HA, cf., e.g., [29, 55]. On the other hand,
even if Z consists entirely of “standard” axioms, something is wrong with the relationship
between iZ and cZ if negative translations are not adequate – and as it turns out, this
can indeed happen with very simple modal reduction principles [58, §4.5]. Contrast for
example 4, i.e., the transitivity axiom p → p, with axioms like C4 : p → p or
[4 : p → p. In the light of our Enveloped Implication Theorem, i.e., Theorem 18,
the logic i4 is ¬¬-complete (Corollary 19), but iC4 (Example 11 and Theorem 12) or i[4
(Example 13 and Theorem 14) are not.
An interesting feature of general positive results in the present paper is that we were
able to show them purely syntactically. This contrasts with less constructive methods
typically employed in modal logic as “die Klassentheorie” [58], cf. § 2 for a discussion of
these points and more details. Note that a similar approach was pursued in investigation
of the Glivenko translation for substructural logics by Ono and coauthors [43, 20]. This
allows a straightforward formalization in a proof assistant, to which the reader is referred for
omitted details of proofs.1 It is possible, however, to provide semantic characterizations of
¬¬-completeness: this is briefly discussed in § 7 and the details are postponed to future work.
1 Plain Coq in our case, but translating this development to any other setting would be straightfor-
ward: we only used a small number of our own tacticals to shorten proof scripts. To download,
git clone git://git8.cs.fau.de/dnegmod. Web front-end available at https://cal8.cs.fau.de/
redmine/projects/dnegmod. As described in the README file, full documentation can be produced
by make all-gal.pdf. We have tested the development in several versions of Coq, ranging from 8.4pl4
(November 2015) to 8.6 (May 2017).
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2 Logics and proof systems
Modal formulas over a supply of propositional variables Σ (unless stated otherwise, fixed
and dropped from the notation) are defined by
LΣ φ, ψ ::= ⊥ | p | φ→ ψ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ
where p ∈ Σ. L denotes the pure propositional language (i.e., without ). We follow standard
conventions regarding binding priorities and associativity of connectives; in particular, we
assume → associates to the right. As usual, ¬φ is φ → ⊥. To save space and improve
readability, let us slightly tweak typographically ¬¬φ to ¬¬φ.2 Also, as usual, a substitution
is a function s : Σ 7→ L. Its uniquely determined extension s : L 7→ L will be
notationally conflated with s itself. A particularly important substitution s¬¬(·) is generated
by s¬¬(p) := ¬¬p for each p ∈ Σ.
Unlike the classical case, it matters that  is primitive and ♦ is not. There are several
possible approaches to combining  and ♦ in the intuitionistic setting (overviews can be
found, e.g., in [11, 46, 56, 57]); to save space and promote clarity, we leave the discussion of
negative translations in each of these setups to future work.
2.1 Intuitionistic modal logics à la Hilbert
As usual, by a(n intuitionistic normal modal) logic we understand a set of formulas closed
under
the axioms of intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC),













The smallest set of formulas closed under these rules is denoted as iK. For any Z ⊆ L,
the smallest intuitionistic normal modal logic containing Z – i.e., the normal extension of
iK axiomatized by Z – is denoted by iZ.3 Furthermore, cZ is the smallest logic (in the
above sense) containing Z and the classical propositional calculus (CPC); we can formally
define it as iZ + ¬¬p→ p. Note here that for sets of axioms, it is notationally convenient
to omit singleton brackets and replace ∪ by +. The smallest modal logic containing CPC
is denoted as cK. Finally, let us write φ `iZ ψ for φ → ψ ∈ iZ and φ a`iZ ψ for
φ↔ ψ ∈ iZ.
Such a Hilbert-style definition of a logic is rather inconvenient for proof search or, indeed,
for most proofs by structural induction on formulas. Nevertheless, it lends itself to a natural
process of algebraization, Lindenbaum-Tarski style: in the case of intuitionistic (or classical)
 one obtains expansions of Heyting (or Boolean) algebras with equational axioms capturing
that  distributes over arbitrary finite (possibly empty) conjunctions. Additional equations
2 This notation indicates the perspective on double negation as a modality, especially over negation-free
and bottom-free intutionistic syntax [10, 17]. We will discuss this briefly in § 7.
3 Conceivable notational conventions to be found in the literature include also, e.g., iK +Z or IntK⊕Z.
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encode additional axioms from Z. Futhermore, such algebras can be dually represented as
Esakia spaces, Priestley spaces, descriptive general frames or (in the classical case) Stone
coalgebras for the Vietoris functor [32], which allows topological or model-theoretic technology
in investigating large classes of logics. The use of algebras and/or their duals and the need to
formalize a reasonably large fragment of their metatheory, however, complicates formalization
in proof assistants, limiting their transparency, transferability and the potential for program
extraction and computational interpretation. It is also worth adding that most standard
approaches to this line of investigation are rather non-constructive; even in purely algebraic
research, one often relies on various consequences of the Axiom of Choice (such as the
existence of a subdirect decomposition of any algebra) and still more so in representation
and duality results leading to classes of frames, spaces and coalgebras mentioned above.4
2.2 Intuitionistic modal logics à la Gentzen
For logics with additional axioms of a specific syntactic shape, there are generic methods
producing, e.g., suitable hyper-sequent calculi allowing cut-elimination. Especially in the
substructural setting, the scope of such methods is systematically studied by algebraic or
systematic proof theory (cf., e.g., [14, 15]), but this line of work also reveals that there
are fundamental limitations on the shape of suitable axioms. Similar restrictions apply to
labelled natural-deduction calculi for extensions of iK (cf., e.g., [46, §6.3]). And, needless
to say, there are many examples of ostentatiously misbehaving formulas, in particular those
axiomatizing undecidable logics.
Is there any chance then of using Gentzen-inspired methods to prove general characteriz-
ation results for arbitrary axioms such as our Theorems 15 and 18 below?
The solution turns out to be surprisingly simple: we do not need to postulate unrestricted
substitution as an explicit rule. As first observed, to the best of our knowledge, by Sobociński
(in a Hilbert-style setting) [47, 34], propositional deductions can be put in a form where the
substitution rule is only applied to axioms. This idea can be replayed in a Gentzen-style
setup. Obviously, we cannot assume that such systems with additional axioms would allow
in general results like normalization/cut-elimination, not to mention Martin-Löf-style local
soundness and local completeness [44]. But they will do a perfectly fine job in improving the
support for structural induction on formulas, and this is all we need in this paper.
Given the simplicity of our goals, there is no need to complicate our presentation (and the
associated Coq formalization) with additional apparatus like labels, multiple contexts, nested
sequents, hypersequents etc. Instead, just like in the work of Kakutani [30], we take as our
base the standard, single-context ND-calculus for iK by Bellin, de Paiva and Ritter [5, 6, 16]
– with additional tweaks such as not only presenting everything in a sequent notation, but
explicitly using multisets. Essentially, this yields a calculus equivalent to those obeying the
so-called Complete Discharge Convention [50],[51, §2.1.10].
Thus, let Γ,Γ′,∆ . . . range over finite multisets of formulas from L. As usual, let
∧
Γ
be the conjunction of all formulas from Γ. For any given set of axioms Z, the rules of its
corresponding calculus NiZ governing derivability of judgements of the form Γ ⇒ φ are







4 There are more constructive approaches, but they are not often used by modal logicians studying entire
lattices of logics; thus, their metatheory and the body of relevant results on offer are less developed.









`NiZ Γ, φ⇒ ψ
`NiZ Γ⇒ φ→ ψ
→E
`NiZ Γ⇒ φ→ ψ `NiZ Γ⇒ φ
`NiZ Γ⇒ ψ
∧I
`NiZ Γ⇒ φ `NiZ Γ⇒ ψ
`NiZ Γ⇒ φ ∧ ψ
∧E1
`NiZ Γ⇒ φ ∧ ψ
`NiZ Γ⇒ φ
∧E2




`NiZ Γ⇒ φ ∨ ψ
∨I2
`NiZ Γ⇒ ψ
`NiZ Γ⇒ φ ∨ ψ
∨E
`NiZ Γ⇒ φ ∨ ψ `NiZ φ,Γ⇒ χ `NiZ ψ,Γ⇒ χ
`NiZ Γ⇒ χ
The Bellin, de Paiva and Ritter rule for iK [5, 6, 30, 16]:
K
`NiZ Γ⇒ φ1 . . . `NiZ Γ⇒ φn `NiZ φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ ψ
`NiZ Γ⇒ ψ
The Sobociński-style rule for additional axioms [47, 34]:
AxSb
ζ ∈ Z s a substitution
`NiZ Γ⇒ s(ζ)
Figure 1 Rules of NiZ .
I Theorem 1. For any Z, Γ and α, `NiZ Γ⇒ α iff
∧
Γ→ α ∈ iZ.
2.3 Semantics
We keep discussion of semantics to a minimum. We only need intuitionistic Kripke frames
to disprove the validity of certain formulas. We refer the reader to numerous references
[26, 11, 46, 36] for a more detailed discussion. Thus, recall that a(n intuitionistic -) frame is
of the form F := 〈W, ↑, 〉, where ↑ ⊆ W×W is a partial order onW and ⊆ W×W
satifies ↑; ; ↑ ⊆  , where “;” is the relational composition; in other words,  is closed
under pre- and postfixing with ↑. A valuation V maps elements of Σ to subsets of W , which
are upward closed w.r.t. ↑. It is used to define a forcing relation  between elements of
W and formulas of L using the usual clauses for intuitionistic connectives with ↑ used to
interpret implication and with  used to interpret , i.e.,
F, V, w  φ if for any w′ s.t. w  w′, we have that F, V, w′  φ .
The interaction condition ensures that denotations of all formulas are upward closed w.r.t. ↑;
in fact, even a much weaker one would do, but as long as normal  is the only additional
modality, imposing ↑; ; ↑ ⊆  is harmless [26, 11, 46, 36]. We write V for the inductive
extension of V to all formulas, i.e., V (φ) is the set of all points where φ holds. It is well-known
(and trivial to check) that the set of all formulas which hold throughout W under every
valuation is a logic. Finally, when representing countermodels graphically, we will use • for
 -irreflexive points and ◦ for  -reflexive ones.
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2.4 Intuitionistic double negation laws
While this paper is concerned with propositional logic, in some places it will be useful
to contrast double negation laws in modal and in predicate logic. We write IQC for the
intuitionistic (first-order) predicate calculus. To save space and avoid distractions, the reader
is referred to, e.g., Troelstra and van Dalen [52, Ch. 2] for an axiomatization.
Intuitionistic laws for ¬¬ relevant from our point of view are summarized below. A fuller
list can be found, e.g., in Ferreira and Oliva [21], where the reader is referred to for proofs
(see also the associated Coq formalization):
I Lemma 2. We have that:
¬¬φ ∧ ¬¬ψ a`IPC ¬¬(¬¬φ ∧ ¬¬ψ) (1)
¬¬(φ ∧ ψ) a`IPC ¬¬(¬¬φ ∧ ¬¬ψ) (2)
¬¬φ→ ¬¬ψ a`IPC ¬¬(¬¬φ→ ¬¬ψ) (3)
¬¬(φ ∨ ψ) a`IPC ¬¬(¬¬φ ∨ ¬¬ψ) (4)
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) a`IPC ¬¬(¬¬φ ∨ ¬¬ψ) (5)
¬¬(φ→ ψ) a`IPC ¬¬(¬¬φ→ ¬¬ψ) (6)
¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ) a`IPC ¬¬(φ→ ψ) (7)
¬¬∀x.¬¬φ a`IQC ∀x.¬¬φ (8)
3 Negative translations
At least as far as modality-free languages are concerned, standard references provide numerous
overviews of negative translations, e.g., [52, Ch. 2.3], [48, Ch. 6–7], [13, Ch. 2]. However, in
the discussion below we are relying in particular on Ferreira and Oliva [21]. In the modal
case, there is some discussion of negative translations for the basic system iK [11, 28].
The most general conditions for a mapping (·)t : L 7→ L to be considered a translation
function are mirroring those proposed by Gaspar [25]:
I Definition 3. Given a set of axioms Z ⊆ L and a translation function (·)t : L 7→ L,
we say that a translation is Z-sane if for any φ ∈ L, φ↔ φt ∈ cZ. A Z-sane translation
is furthermore called Z-adequate5 if for any Γ and φ, `NcZ Γ⇒ φ implies `NiZ Γt ⇒ φt .
Being both sane and adequate guarantees that φ ∈ cZ iff φt ∈ iZ. Note that Z-sanity
is a rather trivial condition, as it transfers upwards: if iZ ⊆ iY, then Z-sanity ensures
Y-sanity; in particular, K-sanity implies Z-sanity for any Z. The very notion does not need
to be mentioned often from now on and can be tacitly assumed: all the translations we are
concerned with are K-sane. Adequacy, on the other hand, is more of a challenge; as we are
going to see, when some problematic choices are made, even K-adequacy is not guaranteed.
The most direct and thorough solution is the earliest one, proposed by Kolmogorov in
1925: drop ¬¬ in front of every subformula. This obviously extends to the modal setting:
⊥kol := ⊥ pkol := ¬¬p (φ ∧ ψ)kol :=¬¬(φkol ∧ ψkol)
(φ ∨ ψ)kol :=¬¬(φkol ∨ ψkol) (φ→ ψ)kol :=¬¬(φkol → ψkol) (φ)kol := ¬¬φkol
5 Gaspar [25] uses the terminology “characterization” and “soundness”, respectively. Similar conditions
are also discussed by Ferreira and Oliva [21].


















Figure 2 Frames used to show the failure of K-adequacy in Example 4 & Theorem 5 (left) and
Example 6 & Theorem 7 (right), together with suitable valuations.
Of course, the Kolmogorov translation is not a model of parsimony with its liberal use
of ¬¬. There are two possible strategies of eliminating redundant occurrences of double
negation, which we can baptize the inner strategy and the outer strategy.
The inner one is the one leading to (several variants of) the Gödel-Gentzen translation.
then in the inductive definition of the translation, ¬¬ is redundant in clauses for ∧ and →
owing to, respectively, Lemma 2(1) and 2(3) . There are several choices one can make for ∨,
thanks to the validity of Lemma 2(4) and 2(5) ; let us also note that Gödel himself relied
on 2(7) to provide an alternative clause for →, but few authors have followed him in this.
In the predicate case, it is not necessary to prefix the universal quantifier clause with ¬¬,
thanks to Lemma 2(8) . The perspective on  as a restricted form of ∀ would seem to lead
to the naïve Gödel-Gentzen translation:
⊥ggn := ⊥ pggn := ¬¬p (φ ∧ ψ)ggn := φggn ∧ ψggn
(φ ∨ ψ)ggn :=¬¬(φggn ∨ ψggn) (φ→ ψ)ggn := φggn → ψggn (φ)ggn := φggn.
However, this translation is not even K-adequate (see also [11, p. 231–232], [28, §2.2]). A
modal analogue of Lemma 2(8) fails:
I Example 4. We have that ¬¬p → p ∈ cK but as illustrated by models based on
C◦ggn/C•ggn of Figure 2,
(¬¬p→ p)ggn = ¬¬¬¬p→ ¬¬p 6∈ iK.
This can be restated as:
I Theorem 5. For any set of axioms Z which holds either in C◦ggn or in C•ggn, the naïve
Gödel-Gentzen translation ggn is not Z-adequate.
Hence, one can consider the saturated variant of Gödel-Gentzen (see also [11, p. 231–232],
[28, Def 2.26]), which only differs in the clause for :
⊥ggs := ⊥ pggs := ¬¬p (φ ∧ ψ)ggs := φggs ∧ ψggs
(φ ∨ ψ)ggs :=¬¬(φggs ∨ ψggs) (φ→ ψ)ggs := φggs → ψggs (φ)ggs := ¬¬φggs.
The outer strategy is the one taken by Glivenko in 1929. In the propositional case, it
consists in prefixing just the entire formula by ¬¬. In other words, one defines φglv := ¬¬φ.
The double negation connective “penetrates from the outside of” an L-formula thanks to the
validity of Lemma 2(2) , 2(4) and 2(6) . But in this case, the strategy requires an adjustment
even for IQC: ¬¬∀x.φ is not intuitionistically equivalent to ¬¬∀x.¬¬φ. It is natural then
that counterexamples can be found for  too [11, p. 231–232]; although, as we are going to
discuss in § 6, the Glivenko translation does work for a surprisingly large class of logics where
 does not behave like the universal quantifier and, on the other hand, there are some modal
logics corresponding to specific universal theories where the Glivenko translation works for
some formulas [7] (see also § 7).
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I Example 6. Clearly, we have that (¬¬p→ p) ∈ cK but as illustrated by models based
on C◦glv/C•glv of Figure 2,
(¬¬p→ p)glv = ¬¬(¬¬p→ p) 6∈ iK.
Again, this lifts to:
I Theorem 7. For any set of axioms Z which holds either in C◦glv or in C•glv, the Glivenko
translation glv is not Z-adequate.
Thus, we need instead “saturated Glivenko”: (the modal analogue of) Kuroda’s 1951
translation which we can define as φkur := ¬¬φkur, using an auxiliary translation (·)kur defined
as (φ)kur := ¬¬φkur and identity in other inductive clauses, i.e.,
⊥kur := ⊥ pkur := p (φ ∧ ψ)kur := φkur ∧ ψkur
(φ ∨ ψ)kur := φkur ∨ ψkur (φ→ ψ)kur := φkur → ψkur (φ)kur := ¬¬φkur.
3.1 Monotone modular and regular translations
Negative translations of interest to us form a subclass of modular ones as defined by Ferreira
and Oliva [21]. We can define a somewhat narrower umbrella notion: monotone modular
translations. Such a translation is generated by a function
cont : (({,∧,∨,→}× {i, o}) ∪ {Σ,`}) 7→ {0, 1},
with the intuition that 0 and 1, respectively, stand for the number of occurrences of ¬¬
and i and o, respectively, abbreviate inside/outside. We infix the first argument of cont as
subscript. Similarly to Ferreira and Oliva [21], cont` stands for ¬¬ used (or not) in front of
the entire formula (cf. the distinction between (·)kur and (·)kur above).
Define now φt := cont`·¬¬φt , where
⊥t :=⊥ (φ ∧ ψ)t := cont∧o·¬¬(cont∧i·¬¬φt ∧ cont∧i·¬¬ψt)
pt := contΣ·¬¬p (φ ∨ ψ)t := cont∨o·¬¬(cont∨i·¬¬φt ∨ cont∨i·¬¬ψt)
(φ)t := conto·¬¬(conti·¬¬φt) (φ→ ψ)t := cont→o·¬¬(cont→i·¬¬φt → cont→i·¬¬ψt).
I Fact 8. Any monotone modular translation is K-sane, hence Z-sane for any Z ⊆ L.
The Glivenko translation is defined by conglv` := 1 and 0 for all other arguments. The
Kuroda translation is defined by conkur` := 1, conkuri := 1 and 0 elsewhere. The naïve
Gödel-Gentzen translation is defined by conggnΣ := 1, conggn∨o := 1 and 0 elsewhere. The
saturated Gödel-Gentzen translation is defined by conggsΣ := 1, conggs∨o := 1, conggso := 1
and 0 elsewhere. The Kolmogorov translation is defined by conkolΣ := 1, conkol∗o := 1
for ∗ ∈ {,∧,∨,→} and 0 elsewhere. There is a natural weak saturation ordering on
such translations: t ≤ t′ whenever cont is pointwise below cont′ (obviously, 0 ≤ 1). Thus,
ggn ≤ ggs ≤ kol and glv ≤ kur. Any monotone modular translation weakly saturating either
ggs or kur is called regular. As the question of adequacy of regular translations will be of
central importance below, let us introduce a name for it.
I Definition 9. A logic iZ is ¬¬-complete if some/any regular t is adequate for it.
I Theorem 10. Any regular translation t is K-adequate, i.e., iK is ¬¬-complete. Further-
more, for every φ ∈ L we have that `K φt ↔ ¬¬φt and for any other regular translation t′,
we have that `K φt ↔ φt
′ .
As said above, ¬¬-completeness of the minimal system iK has already been noted in the
literature [11, 28]. But not all logics are ¬¬-complete.







V (p) := ∅











W (p) := a0↑
Figure 3 Frames used to show the failure of ¬¬-completeness in Example 11 & Theorem 12 (left)
and Example 13 & Theorem 14 (right), together with suitable valuations.
4 Failure of ¬¬-completeness
This section presents counterexamples illustrating that there are logics for which regular
translations are not adequate. Apart from counterexamples in the previous section, this is
the only place where we need to use Kripke semantics.
I Example 11. Consider the frame Cden with valuation V depicted in Figure 3. We have
that Cden  iC4, where C4 := p→ p. But
Cden, V, a0 1 ¬¬¬¬¬¬p→ ¬¬¬¬p.
To see this, observe that V (¬¬p) = ∅, V (¬¬p) = {b0} = b0↑ and V (¬¬¬¬p) = {b0, b1} =
b1↑, whereas V (¬¬¬¬p) is the entire carrier of Cden and hence so is V (¬¬¬¬¬¬p).
This lifts to a theorem about an interval of logics:
I Theorem 12. No extension of iK contained between iC4 and the logic of Cden is ¬¬-
complete.
Is this an isolated example? As it turns out, ¬¬-completeness can fail for other rather
simple modal reduction principles [58, §4.5] as well.
I Example 13. Consider [4 := p→ p and the frame Ctr2 with valuation W depicted
in Figure 3. We can easily show that Ctr2  [4. On the other hand,
Ctr2,W, a0 1 ¬¬¬¬¬¬p→ ¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬p.
This is verified as follows:
a1↑=W (¬¬¬¬p), b1↑=W (¬¬p) = W (¬¬¬¬¬¬p),
a0↑=W (p) = W (¬¬p) = W (¬¬¬¬¬¬p), b0↑=W (¬¬¬¬p) = W (¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬p).
I Theorem 14. No logic contained between i[4 and the logic of Ctr2 is ¬¬-complete.
4.1 Aside: with great power comes great inadequacy
While in this paper we focus almost entirely on the simplest possible case of -logics,
inadequacy can be a more dramatic phenomenon for very natural systems with more
connectives, e.g., residuated binary ones of BI: the logic of bunched implications [42, 45].
On the one hand, Galmiche et al. [24] have shown that BI is decidable; this result allows
strengthening and generalizations [22]. On the other hand, the undecidability of its classical
extension BBI follows already from results of Kurucz et al. [33, 2] (shown using von Neumann’s
n-frames originating in projective geometry) and has been recently rediscovered and extended
to logics determined by concrete heap models using more computational techniques [12, 35].
Hence, no recursive translation from BBI to BI (much less a modular negative one) can be
adequate; otherwise, one could use such a translation to define a decision procedure for BBI.
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5 Syntactic criteria of ¬¬-completeness
Given that ¬¬-completeness can fail so dramatically for very natural axioms, it is natural to
ask how one can obtain general positive results. First, let us analyze where the problem comes
from. By definition, a logic fails to be ¬¬-complete iff there exists φ ∈ cZ s.t. φt 6∈ iZ. It
would seem that nothing forces this φ to be itself an axiom, i.e., a member of Z, but this is
precisely what we see in the counterexamples in the preceding section. The following theorem
shows it is not a coincidence – and provides us with an useful criterion of ¬¬-completeness.
I Theorem 15 (Regular Adequacy).
A logic i{ζ} is ¬¬-complete iff ζt ∈ i{ζ} for some/any regular translation t.
A logic iZ is ¬¬-complete whenever for some/any regular translation t and for any
ζ ∈ Z, it holds that ζt ∈ iZ.
Proof. Fix t = ggs. We need to show that whenever `NcZ Γ⇒ φ, `NiZ Γggs ⇒ φggs. The
proof proceeds by induction on the derivation of `NcZ Γ ⇒ φ. The assumption of the
theorem guarantees the AxSb case. The cases of IPC rules are straightforward and known,
with the case of (∨E) requiring, as usual, somewhat more bookkeeping. Let us show the
modal case, i.e., K. Our goal is to derive `NiZ Γggs ⇒ ¬¬ψggs under the assumption that
`NcZ Γ⇒ φ1, . . . , `NcZ Γ⇒ φn and `NcZ φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ ψ
and hence, by IH,
`NiZ Γ
ggs ⇒ ¬¬φggs1 , . . . , `NiZ Γggs ⇒ ¬¬φggsn and `NiZ φ
ggs
1 , . . . , φ
ggs
n ⇒ ψggs .
But now it is enough to observe that the following rule is derivable:
¬¬K
`NiZ Γ⇒ ¬¬φ1 . . . `NiZ Γ⇒ ¬¬φn `NiZ φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ ψ
`NiZ Γ⇒ ¬¬ψ . J
Thus, whenever a given finite set of axioms Z axiomatizes a logic with a known decision
algorithm, one can use the decision procedure for iZ to check its ¬¬-completeness: i.e., by
checking if the Kolmogorov translation (or any other regular translation, e.g., Kuroda for
simplicity) of each axiom from Z is a member of iZ. Of course, one needs to keep in mind
that the problem whether a given formula axiomatizes a decidable logic is undecidable itself
(see, e.g., [13, Ch. 17], [58, §3] for references). Nevertheless, as we are going to discuss now,
Theorem 15 does yield general positive results on ¬¬-completeness of logics with axioms of a
specific syntactic shape.
I Definition 16. We call β ∈ L a (¬¬-) pre-envelope (in iZ ) if ¬¬s¬¬(β) `iZ βkol;
recall that s¬¬(β) is a substitution replacing all p occurring in β by their double negations.
When not stated specifically, we will take iZ to be iK. Analogously, we call β ∈ L
a (¬¬-) post-envelope (in iZ) if βkol `iZ ¬¬s¬¬(β). A ¬¬-envelope is a formula which is
both pre- and post-envelope, i.e., a formula β ∈ L s.t. ¬¬s¬¬(β) a`iZ βkol. An enveloped
implication is of the form β → γ where β is a post-envelope and γ is a pre-envelope.
Clearly, a ¬¬-envelope can be consider a special (or degenerate) case of an enveloped
implication. To illustrate these notions, recall that a shallow formula is one with no nesting
of , i.e., one where every p ∈ Σ is within the scope of at most one , whereas a box-free
formula is one without any occurrences of  at all. Now we have:
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I Lemma 17 (Envelope Criteria).
A box-free formula is a ¬¬-envelope
A shallow formula with no disjunction under box is a ¬¬-envelope
An implication-free formula is a pre-envelope
A negation of a pre-envelope is a post-envelope
Proof. An exercise in induction. See the associated formalization for details. J
I Theorem 18 (Enveloped Implications). Any logic axiomatized by enveloped implications is
¬¬-complete.
Proof. By Theorem 15, it is enough to show that ζkol ∈ iZ for any ζ ∈ Z, where ζ = β → γ,




`NiZ ¬¬s¬¬(β)→ ¬¬s¬¬(γ), β
kol ⇒ γkol
`NiZ⇒ (¬¬s¬¬(β)→ ¬¬s¬¬(γ))→ β
kol → γkol
`NiZ⇒ ¬¬(¬¬s¬¬(β)→ ¬¬s¬¬(γ))→ ¬¬(β
kol → γkol)







Thus, we just need to show that `NiZ ¬¬s¬¬(β) → ¬¬s¬¬(γ), βkol ⇒ γkol. But this
follows using the definitions of pre- and post-envelopes. J
Theorem 18 jointly with Lemma 17 yields ¬¬-completeness of numerous logics, including,
for example, many of those given in Table 2 of Litak [36] or in Theorem 10 of Sotirov [49].
Here are just some examples, with somewhat random names (although inasmuch as possible
we respect those already used in existing literature):
I Corollary 19. ¬¬-completeness holds for any logic axiomatized over iK by any combination
of the following formulas:
R p→ p, CB p→ (q → p) ∨ q, [em p ∨¬p,
4 p→ p, NV ¬⊥, em[ p ∨ ¬p,
T p→ p, NNV ¬¬⊥, T¬¬ p→ ¬¬p,
coK (p→ q)→ (p→ q), [R p→ p, T¬ ¬p→ ¬p,
[Lin (p→ q) ∨(q → p), Lin[ (p→ q) ∨ (q → p), wem[¬ ¬p ∨ ¬¬p,
or any superintuitionistic axiom, i.e., a formula in modality-free L.
As an example of a standard logic obtained by a combination of axioms given in Corol-
lary 19, consider iS4 = i4 + T.
Counterexamples in § 4 were easily seen to produce entire intervals of ¬¬-incomplete
logics (Theorems 12 and 14). In contrast, Corollary 19 does not automatically lead to
non-trivial examples of entire intervals of ¬¬-complete logics, especially not to logics all of
whose extensions are ¬¬-complete. Corollary 19 mentions, e.g., i4 and Example 11 together
with Theorem 12 provide an example of an extension of i4 for which ¬¬-completeness fails:
the logic of Cden. However, Corollary 19 also mentions iR – and for this system, we can do
much better. As it turns out, this is related to another subject: for some classes of logics,
irregular translations can be adequate.
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6 Strength makes irregularity adequate
The failure of the Glivenko translation amounts to the failure of the “outer strategy” described
in § 3 to penetrate through . The axiom ∀x.¬¬φ → ¬¬∀x.φ which ensures this strategy
succeeds in the predicate case is thus called the Double Negation Shift [52, Ch. 2] and in
some references also Kuroda principle (scheme, axiom) – see, e.g., [20] for an example of
both names in use. It is natural to use similar name(s) for its modal analogue. In other
words, the (modal)Double Negation Shift (or the modal Kuroda axiom) is
DNS: ¬¬p→ ¬¬p.
The corresponding logic is naturally denoted as iDNS. Clearly, we have that for any iZ
extending iDNS and any φ ∈ L, ¬¬¬¬φ↔ ¬¬φ ∈ iZ. In fact, it is straightforward
to see that these two axiom schemes are equivalent:
I Lemma 20. DNS and ¬¬¬¬p↔ ¬¬p axiomatize the same logic.
We have an analogue of Exercise 2.3.3 in Troelstra and van Dalen [52]:
I Theorem 21. In any extension of iDNS, the Glivenko translation becomes equivalent to
the regular ones, i.e., for any regular t and every φ, we have that: `iDNS φt ↔ φglv.
Hence, we have ¬¬-completeness of all logics in which the Kuroda axiom is derivable:
I Theorem 22. Any t saturating glv is adequate for any extension of iDNS.
Proof Sketch. It is straightforward to extend Theorem 21 to any translation saturating
Glivenko, i.e., for any extension of iDNS each such translation is equivalent to, e.g.,
the Kolmogorov translation. Hence, it is enough to show that kol is adequate. Now
apply Theorem 15 and consider an arbitrary formula ζ ∈ iZ, where Z is a freely chosen
axiomatization of the logic in question. We need to show that ζkol belongs to iZ. But
Theorem 21 says that ζkol a`iDNS ¬¬ζ and ζ → ¬¬ζ holds in any extension of iK. J
Are extensions of iDNS of interest? Consider iR = iK + p→ p, which can be seen
as the logic of applicative functors, also known as idioms [37]. Our presently used name R
follows the usage in Litak [36], which in turn uses the same name as Fairtlough and Mendler
[19]; another possible justification for this name would come from the “return” law of monads.
An alternative name would be S, coming from, on the one hand, the strong Löb axiom
SL: (p→ p)→ p,
and on the other hand from categorical “strength” of  thought of as a functor, whose trace
on the level of type/object inhabitation is
Str: p ∧q → (p ∧ q).
It is easy to see that R and Str are interderivable over iK.6 Regarding the strong Löb axiom,
the derivation of S in iSL can be found, e.g., in Milius and Litak [38, §3] (in a categorical
disguise). It is a simplified variant of the deduction of 4 from the ordinary Löb axiom found
independently by de Jongh, Kripke and Sambin in mid-1970’s, cf. [9, Th 18]. SL is an axiom
whose importance has been first noticed in provability logics HA∗ and PA∗ [54, 29]. Its recent
popularity deriving from Nakano [40, 41] comes from its rôle in guarding (co-)recursion and
6 We decided against the use of S to avoid confusion with standard modal names S4 and S5, which come
from unfortunate historical coincidences.
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(co-)induction.7 Another important class of extensions of iR is provided by extensions
of PLL := iR + C4 (Propositional Lax Logic [19]): the logic of the Grothendieck topology
[26], but also access control and the Curry-Howard counterpart of Moggi’s computational
metalanguage (see [36] for references). Recall that above iK, C4 was one of our flagship
examples of an axiom failing ¬¬-completeness. Finally, Artemov and Protopopescu [4] use
the BHK interpretation to justify the epistemic importance of certain extension of iR and
PLL. In short, despite the non-classical character of these modalities, we are dealing with a
large class of important extensions of iK; as mentioned in the introduction, this puts in
doubt Simpson’s Requirement 3 [46, Ch 3.2]. And we have:
I Theorem 23. DNS is a theorem of iR.
Proof. First, observe that
→I
→E
`NiR ¬¬φ,¬φ⇒ φ `NiR ¬¬φ,¬φ⇒ ¬φ
`NiR ¬¬φ,¬φ⇒ ⊥
`NiR ¬¬φ⇒ ¬¬φ.
Hence, we just need to derive `NiR ¬¬φ,¬φ⇒ φ. For this, it is enough to show
`NiR ¬¬φ,¬φ⇒ ⊥.
This in turn is obtained via
K
`NiR ¬¬φ,¬φ⇒ ¬φ `NiR ¬¬φ,¬φ⇒ ¬¬φ `NiR ¬¬φ,¬φ⇒ ⊥
`NiR ¬¬φ,¬φ⇒ ⊥.
Only the first premise is interesting, and this is the only part of the proof where the R axiom
is actually used:
→E
`NiR ¬φ⇒ ¬φ `NiR ¬φ⇒ ¬φ→ ¬φ
AxSb
`NiR ¬φ⇒ ¬φ.
The derivation of `NiR ¬φ⇒ ¬φ can be now left as an exercise. J
The above deduction should look familiar to readers acquainted with CPS reasoning and
the use of control operators.
I Corollary 24. Any t saturating glv is adequate for any extension of iR; in particular,
each such logic is ¬¬-complete.
I Remark 25. Extensions of iR have a rather trivial “double negation core”: cK extended
with the “strength” or “return” axiom R is equipollent with CPC enriched with an additional
propositional constant (corresponding to ⊥). There are only three consistent (and coNP-
complete) logics of this kind, whereas the lattice of extensions of iR is uncountable and
7 It is used to ensure productivity in (co-)programming and on the metalevel – in semantic reasoning
about programs involving higher-order store or a combination of impredicative quantification with
recursive types. There are too many recent references to quote here, so let us just point out that Milius
and Litak [38] provide a general framework for various categorical models in the literature, ranging from
ultrametric spaces to the topos of trees of Birkedal and coauthors [8]. For more references, see also [36].
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richer than the lattice of extensions of IPC, which can be identified with PLL +p↔ p. In
particular, logics extending iR can happen to be undecidable. Hence, in many ways the gap
between iR and cR is more dramatic than that between iS4 and cS4. One can see the
fact that the “double negation core” of any extension of iR collapses so much information
as a deeper reason behind Corollary 24.
7 Conclusions and future work
While we consciously restricted our attention to syntactic criteria and syntactic proofs in this
paper, it is also possible to prove positive general results for adequacy and ¬¬-completeness
in terms of stability under ↑-cofinal and ↑-generated subframes; indeed, readers familiar with
modal logic probably noticed that counterexamples in § 4 fail to be subframe logics (cf. e.g,
[59, §1.8]). In future work, we will discuss whether this approach leads to a more general
characterization of adequacy than Theorem 18.
On another note, one of the reasons why modular translations of Ferreira and Oliva
[21] are defined in a more general way than our monotone modular translations in § 3.1
is that they cover also the so-called Krivine(-Streicher-Reus) translation. This translation
dualizes connectives, in particular uses ∀ and ∃ to translate each other. It would seem
natural to study such translations, but this appears sensible only in the presence of ♦ suitably
related to .8 In this connection, let us recall that Bezhanishvili [7] studies the scope
of Glivenko-type theorems for specific formulas in extensions of Prior’s MIPC, i.e., logics
equipped with  and ♦ which behave as close as possible to genuine ∀ and ∃ for concrete
theories in IQC. Furthermore, it would be of obvious interest to study still more complicated
supplies of connectives and axioms than those involving  and ♦; nevertheless, as discussed
in § 4.1 using BI as an example, things can go very wrong for very natural logics. The
scope of any general positive results will be by nature limited, and a suitable proof-theoretic
setup and associated proof-assistant formalization would be more complicated. Speaking
of substructural connectives, however, it would seem natural to merge the present line of
research with syntactic research on substructural negative translations by Ono and coauthors
[43, 20].
Still a different direction would be to pick up the theme already signalled in Footnote 2:
¬¬ can and has been studied as a modality in its own right [10, 17], especially over negation-
free and bottom-free intutionistic syntax. Algebraically, one can see ¬¬ as a nucleus and
categorically – as (inhabitation/object level trace of) the continuation monad. The cor-
responding generalization of our study of modal negative translations would connect with
the work of Aczel [1] and Escardó and Oliva [18]. Replacement of the intuitionistic logic
with the minimal logic would be of interest given the significance of the latter in terms of
control operators [3]. Surely enough, one cannot expect each and every possible modal axiom
to enjoy some computational significance. Pfenning and Davies [44] stress the importance
of adequate introduction and elimination rules in this context, Martin-Löf style; contrast
this with our discussion in § 2.2 of the unavailability of an apparatus producing such rules
for arbitrary axioms without any syntactic restrictions on their shape. At the very least,
however, we hope that the present development provides good limitative results and a general
8 An interesting intermediate challenge was posed by one of the referees: broadening the framework
somewhat to allow modal versions of the double negation translations mKu [21, §1], E [21, §5] or N1
[25], which contrarily to Krivine translation can be still introduced with a single modality. Such a
generalization would require more technicalities; e.g. for E, the straightforward ordering proposed in
§ 3.1 and some of the statements and proofs will need to become more complicated.
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framework for investigating the relationship between constructive and classical variants of
concrete axioms/inhabitation laws. More generally, we believe that our study illustrates the
availability of purely constructive and syntactic methods in modal logic understood as “die
Klassentheorie” [58]. We do not claim that such methods can or should replace algebraic,
topological and model-theoretic ones. Nevertheless, it is good to remember that they can
be employed in the service of what Wolter and Zakharyaschev [58] call the global view and
intuitionistic modal logics seem a particularly natural target.
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